

2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER

Australia's Strategic Defence Framework

Strategic Defence Interests		
A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication.	A secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and the South Pacific.	A stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.
Strategic Defence Objectives		
Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests, and northern approaches.	Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen their security.	Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia's interests in a rules-based global order.

= Defence of Australia (DOA) strategy.

Maritime focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Table of Contents overview

- **Capability:** the personnel, equipment, platforms ... that influence the capacity to undertake military operations
- **Defence posture:** « what Australia does with the Defence Force it already has ». Necessary element to plan for the defence force Australia « would like to have and might get if funding assumptions hold ».
 - <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-2016-defence-white-paper-good-posture/>
- Cooperation with Indonesia?
 - counterterrorism, maritime engagement, HADR, peacekeeping and intelligence.
 - Modernisation Indonesian Armed Forces = '**positive development**'
- Japan:
 - +++ bilateral relationship has come (will probably get submarine contracts)
 - cooperation include intelligence, developing common capabilities like the Joint Strike Fighter, air and missile defence and maritime warfare technologies..
- Money:
 - defence budget '**just ahead**' of 2% of gross domestic product in 2020–21.
 - **three years** before Tony Abbott's pledge.

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- Global order unravelled
- Rigour and seriousness
- \$ figures
- Response to the regional « arms race »

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- Avoids drawing necessary conclusions





Figure 1: Indicative Defence Spending to 2035

- Capability gap – time to build ships
- Risk of non-delivery – 2 or 3 administrations
- Climate change

Stark tone

- ++towards China (SCS)
- « challenges some of the rules »
- ‘Australia is particularly concerned by the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities’
- Countries should be: ‘open and transparent about end-state purposes of land reclamation activities’
- Rules-based order *17
- Russia and Ukraine *2

Maritime strategy



Chapter 2: Strategic Outlook

- 2 .41 Within the broader Indo-Pacific region, in the **next two decades, half of the world's submarines will be operating in the region**. Within the same period, at least half of the world's advanced combat aircraft armed with extended range missiles and supported by highly sophisticated information networks, will be operated by Indo-Pacific countries .
- 2 .42 Some regional countries will acquire longer-range precision-guided missiles, including ship-based missiles, over the period to 2035 . Advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, including both space and high altitude capabilities, will be prevalent, reducing the effectiveness of stealth capabilities . The region will see more autonomous systems, such as unmanned combat vehicles, in operation in the sub-surface, surface and air environments .